Wednesday, October 20, 2010

Succintness Exercise

William Lycan argues for theories of higher order representation in the face of criticisms from Dretske, Guzeldere and Siewert who claim that HOR theories are extravagant, unmotivated, confused or worse. Lycan argues giant these claims, however by moving from the definition of a conscious state, to intentionality and intentionality as representation which follows that awareness of, is representation of a mental state which ultimately proves his claim that an individuals conscious state is a slate represented by and their mental state.

Tuesday, October 19, 2010

Conceptual Analysis of Honor Cultures

Cultures of honour, or honor cultures, are subcultures which define themselves through a more individualistic view of justice than a culture of law which focuses on the group-agreed upon justice within its cultural boundaries. In many regards these two types of cultures are contrary to one another, one being about the individual, one about the group, but both seek to fulfill the same role: justice.

Generally, a culture of law is found on a state level, opposed to a culture of honor which is much more likely to be found within a small, tight-knit group or at the small community level. Richard Nisbett likens a culture of honor to a herding and frontier society. A society in which there is little cooperation outside of close groups and kin, especially with strangers; the protection of scarce resources is vital for survival; crime, especially theft, is commonplace; and there is little or no protection provided by the state. He further likens an ‘institutionalized culture’ to agricultural societies, claiming that they rely heavily on cooperation between relative strangers, it is not necessary to protect one’s resources as the rewards of theft do not outweigh the risks, discouraging individualism is important for the group not just the individual and that there is some sort of governing body which polices and enforces norms regarding cooperation and criminal behavior. These two types of culture are governed by different retribution motivators, determining their retributive process. In institutionalized cultures, this motivator is moral responsibility to the group of the culture. In an honor culture, the main motivator for action is obviously honor. There is certainly an overlap between the two cultures’ motivators as honor cultures have a notion of moral responsibility and cultures of law have notions of honor. It is important to recognize the overlap, but also realize that this is by no means the main motivator for retributive action.

Cultures of honour are exemplified in subcultures such as southern white America, inner-city black culture (more specifically gang culture) and even the culture in the American Midwest after the acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase in 1804. In all of these cultures, when someone is wronged, they are expected to enact swift, and generally violent, revenge on their wrongdoer. This reaction seems to have its roots in the desire of members of an honor culture to deter potential criminals from taking advantage of their scarce resources. Because of the lack of governing body to police and enforce these laws, the individual must take it upon themselves to ward against theft. Though this course of retaliation seems drastic and full of risk, the risk from this recourse is far less than the risk of losing one’s property, wealth and livelihood destroyed or stolen in one offense. In American Midwest and inner city gang culture, this reaction seems to maintain this feeling of protecting one’s resources, but in the present day American southern culture, the protection of resources doesn’t seem to be the main goal of the honor culture. However, in this culture, a verbal or sometimes physical insult (or assault) is deemed as offensive and damaging as a theft of resources and there is great normative pressure for those offended to seek revenge. This is because if retaliation is not sought quickly and with severe enough punishment to the offender, the offended citizen is seen as an easy target to the other members of the culture for future wrongdoing.

The cultures of law, or institutionalized culture, utilize retribution to discourage individual free-riding instead of the protection of specific resources. Individuals are not necessarily at risk of losing their livelihood because of a theft or raid and therefore the need to deter such crimes is not the most important part of the justice system. The desire is to punish the offender to defer them from “cheating” the system again. A third party, generally a state appointed judicial system, is in charge of doling out this punishment. Who this system is comprised of is irrelevant because it is not necessary to indicate who was wronged as to discourage action against that specific person, but rather to indicate that the system is not to be taken lightly and offenders will be punished.

Cultures of honor demand that their citizens impose their justice upon the rest of the society when they are wronged. They alone are responsible for their retribution and are expected to exact it upon the offending party. Without this unwritten code of action, governed by honor, the culture wouldn’t function properly. The individualism required in a culture of honor is in opposition to an institutionalized culture, which requires that the state be responsible for the punishment of wrongdoers in an attempt to deter them, and others, from cheating the society and getting a free-ride.

Sunday, September 19, 2010

Revision

If one knows something, one believes it, has justification for believing it, and it's true.

To know, as defined by Merriam Webster Dictionary, one must "be aware of the truth or factuality of" this knowledge. The argument that one is capable of knowing something false is a misuse of the English language not an assertion that a false belief can be knowledge. Being aware of the factuality of a belief is proper justification for that belief to be labelled as knowledge rather than just a belief which is not always necessarily true.

For something to be correctly labelled as knowledge, it must be believed by someone with proper justification, but must also be factually true. Many times it is the factuality of an idea which produces the justification for and belief in the idea. We do not call a young child's belief in the existence of Santa Claus knowledge, but rather refer to it as an unfounded belief perceived as factually true by the child. The justification for their perception of truth is an internal one, generated by their imagination rather than factuality, resulting in a belief, not knowledge.

An idea must satisfy all three statements of belief, justification and factuality to be considered knowledge instead of merely a belief. Anything that satisfies less than all three points is not knowledge even if the English language allows a speaker to claim it as such.


Tuesday, September 7, 2010

First!

If one knows something, one believes it, has justification for believing it, and it's true.

For one to know something, one must "be aware of the truth or factuality of" this knowledge. By implying that one "knows" something, they are, by definition, implying that a person has just reasoning for believing so. Assuming that people are rational in their acceptance of knowledge, as they should be assumed to be, would confirm the final statement in this sentence, "it is true", because to truly "know" something, one must have proper justification. Proper justification should be derived from factual truth, as the definition of "to know" states that it must.

The argument that someone may know something false is a misuse of the English language, rather than the assertion that their knowledge is indeed knowledge. "Knowing" something false is merely a belief, rather than actual knowledge of something falsely. When a child "knows" Santa Claus is real, we as adults "know" that this knowledge is simply a belief. This is no different for adults than it is for children. Up until around the 17th century, the vast majority of the population of the world believed, falsely, that the Earth was flat. They treated this as knowledge, but we in the present, with a much better understanding of our world, know this was a false belief without any real justification and obviously without factuality.

Therefore, to be able to say that one truly knows something, one must have proper justification, including factuality and truth rather than internal justification which produces beliefs, rather than true knowledge.